

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING FACTORS OF CULTURE AND RELGION

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

13 May 2002

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

<b>1. Report Security Classification:</b> UNCLASSIFIED			
<b>2. Security Classification Authority:</b>			
<b>3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:</b>			
<b>4. Distribution/Availability of Report:</b> DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
<b>5. Name of Performing Organization:</b> JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
<b>6. Office Symbol:</b>  C		<b>7. Address:</b> NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
<b>8. Title</b> (Include Security Classification): THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING FACTORS OF CULTURE AND RELIGION			
<b>9. Personal Authors:</b> Lieutenant Colonel Calvin F. Swain Jr.			
<b>10. Type of Report:</b> FINAL		<b>11. Date of Report:</b> 13 May 2002	
<b>12. Page Count:</b> 26		<b>12A Paper Advisor (if any):</b> N/A	
<b>13. Supplementary Notation:</b> A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
<b>14. Ten key words that relate to your paper:</b>  Culture, Religion, Mission Analysis, Course of Action Development, Operational Factor, Just War, Islam, Judaism, Joint Doctrine, Vietnam, Somalia			
<b>15. Abstract:</b>  The growth of nationalism and fundamentalism in an ever more globalized world economy ensures that cross-cultural interaction will lead to cultural and religious conflicts. Operational commanders that do not consider the operational factors of culture and religion during mission planning and execution invite unintended and unforeseen consequences and mission failure. Current joint doctrine does not provide operational commanders with a comprehensive and structured approach to cultural and religious considerations in the operational planning process. Culture and religion are significant factors that operational commanders must formally consider during operational planning in a more structured and focused manner in order to mitigate possible negative impacts upon plan execution and operational success. Additional staff support for the Combatant Commander, more detailed cultural rules of engagement for mission participants, and modification of Joint Doctrine to include a framework for considering culture and religion during the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) will mitigate the potential negative effects of culture and religion on mission planning and execution.			
<b>16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:</b>	Unclassified  X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
<b>17. Abstract Security Classification:</b> UNCLASSIFIED			
<b>18. Name of Responsible Individual:</b> CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
<b>19. Telephone:</b> 841-6461		<b>20. Office Symbol:</b> C	



## Abstract of

### THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING FACTORS OF CULTURE AND RELIGION

The growth of nationalism and fundamentalism in an ever more globalized world economy ensures that cross-cultural interaction will lead to cultural and religious conflicts. Operational commanders that fail to consider the operational factors of culture and religion during mission planning and execution invite unintended and unforeseen consequences and mission failure. Current joint doctrine does not provide operational commanders with a comprehensive and structured approach to cultural and religious considerations in the operational planning process. Culture and religion are significant factors that operational commanders must formally consider during operational planning in a more structured and focused manner in order to mitigate possible negative impacts upon plan execution and operational success. Additional staff support for the Combatant Commander, more detailed cultural rules of engagement for mission participants, and modification of Joint Doctrine to include a framework for considering culture and religion during the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) will mitigate

the potential negative effects of culture and religion on mission planning and execution.

Military leaders, educated by history, experience, and strategists as ancient as Sun Tzu, understand that knowledge of the enemy is critical to operational success.<sup>1</sup> Culture and religion, previously not appreciated as important operational factors, are increasingly significant in the modern, electronically interconnected, economically globalized world environment. Commanders who fail to adequately consider culture and religion as operational factors during planning invite unintended and unforeseen consequences and mission failure. Cultural and religious ignorance of allies and enemies negatively impact coalition coherence, mask enemy and expose friendly centers of gravity, delay or deter operational success, and influence conflict termination and implementation of the operational commander's exit strategy.

Culture and religion are significant operational factors that commanders must formally consider during operational planning in a more structured and focused manner in order to mitigate possible negative impacts upon plan execution and operational success. Current joint doctrine does not provide a comprehensive and structured approach to cultural and religious

considerations in the operational planning process. Solutions offered herein include additional staff support for the Combatant Commander, the creation of more detailed cultural rules of engagement for mission participants, and modification of joint doctrine to include a framework for considering culture and religion during the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES). To understand the impact of culture and religion on operational planning and how best to mitigate their effects, it is necessary to review the world's major religions' attitudes toward war, consider historical examples of the significance of that impact, review current joint doctrine and recommend specific improvements to the operational planning process.

"People . . . identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations."<sup>2</sup> Culture is largely derivative of religion throughout the world and is often the root cause of mistrust, misunderstanding and conflict.<sup>3</sup> American military leaders, educated in a constitutional democracy that consciously separates the political from the religious, are susceptible to mirror image thinking that does not adequately account for the importance of religion in other cultures. The danger for

the commander lies in his lack of awareness of religious beliefs that animate his potential adversary or cause him to inadvertently alienate a coalition partner. Knowledge and understanding of the various religion's attitudes toward the use of violence to achieve political ends and the proper conduct of war within the constraints of a particular faith will aid the operational commander in the planning process.

The review of the world's major religions' attitudes toward war begins with the most familiar, that of Christianity and the "Just War" theory. Four historical suppositions buttress just war theory. First, evil and tragedy exist. "Not all evil can be avoided...it is a pervasive condition of fallen human existence that riddles the political and social reality..."<sup>4</sup> Second, it is based on natural law and ethically normative for all. Third, just war theory's objective is to diminish its frequency and intensity. Finally, war is a function of the state and not the individual.<sup>5</sup> The application of just war theory requires that war be defensive, meant to deter aggression, proclaimed by legitimate authority, the means of last resort, have a reasonable probability of success, be initiated with just intention, conducted with limited objectives, with non-combatant immunity and use



of proportional means.<sup>6</sup> Significantly for the operational commander the tenets of just war theory reside within international law in the Law of Armed Conflict,<sup>7</sup> are reflected in the Standings Rules of Engagement,<sup>8</sup> and are applied to the U. S. military via the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Ethically the operational commander is responsible for conducting military operations within the constraints of just war theory and for the correct conduct of forces under his command. Clearly just war theory reflects the Christian foundation of American culture and impacts directly operational planning and execution.

Fully twenty percent of the world's population is Islamic and Islam continues to expand. In the future, operational commanders will conduct military operations in Islamic areas of the world and within coalitions that include Muslims. Therefore it is important to understand the Islamic attitude toward war. "The Western distinction between just and unjust wars linked to specific grounds for war is unknown in Islam."<sup>9</sup> Muslims believe that they are religiously obligated to disseminate Islam throughout the world and if non-Muslims do not submit to conversion then Muslims are obliged to wage war against them.<sup>10</sup> The historical instrument for

spreading Islam is the *jihad*. The word *jihad* is more properly defined as "striving" and does not necessarily mean war. There are four distinctive types of *jihad*. The first is the individual's personal fight against evil, the second and third in support of right and correction of wrong, and the fourth, war against unbelievers and enemies of the faith. "It is part of the obligation of the faithful to offer their wealth and lives in this [fourth] war."<sup>11</sup> The spreading of Islam by force is tempered in the modern world as "most Muslims today disavow the duty to propagate Islam by force and limit *jihad* to self-defense."<sup>12</sup> Similar to the Western concept of just war, *jihad* morally restrains and limits warfare to combatants and appropriate targets and demands the use of only the level of force necessary to achieve its objectives. Finally, "Muslims do not view the use of force to propagate Islam as an act of war, given their understanding of the [call]...to abolish war by bringing the entire world into the house of Islam, which is the house of peace."<sup>13</sup>

Although the United States remains the world's lone superpower, it is likely that China, given its growth potential, will someday become a near peer competitor. Potential interaction with China will require the

operational commander to understand the world's largest Buddhist dominated culture. The Buddhist belief that it is wrong to take life or be a party to taking life defines that religion's attitude toward war. "The consequence of taking life is an inferior, gloomy, sorrowful reincarnation."<sup>14</sup> But there are special circumstances, seemingly contradictory to the basic admonition to avoid killing, by which killing is justified. Warfare and violence are first allowed when the doctrine (Buddhism) is under attack. Second, when one can be killed to save two. Third, killing is acceptable because existence is illusory and there is no soul, no self and, therefore, nothing to really kill. Fourth, violence is allowed because it is better to kill another than to allow him to kill. And fifth, because destiny is predetermined, there is no sin in killing.<sup>15</sup> In the modern world Buddhists have come to believe that Buddha did not condemn all wars, rather he condemned militarism, not defense. "In Maoist China Buddhists of radical political outlook have interpreted the Buddha's teaching so as to permit the killing of those opposed to the revolution."<sup>16</sup> Based upon the teaching that it is better to kill than to allow others to kill, the Chinese attitude toward fighting in Korea was "to wipe out

American imperialist demons who are breaking world peace . . . actually gives rise to merit."<sup>17</sup> Although Buddhism teaches peace and non-violence, circumstances ensue that permit violence and warfare constrained only by the Law of Armed Conflict without the limitations of western just war theory.

Hinduism culturally dominates India, a nuclear power overtaking China as the most populous nation on earth. Hinduism is a melding of culture and religion so that there is a distinctive Hindu way of life. An accepted caste system dominates society and the warrior's place is at the second highest level.<sup>18</sup> Hindus have an ambivalence toward war and peace in that war is neither good nor bad - it just happens. Although Hinduism teaches that killing or causing harm to a living creature is wrong there are times when it may be necessary to kill. As in Buddhism, reincarnation ensures that only the body is being killed and physical death does not kill the soul therefore it is appropriate for warriors to do their duty in life, as any other member of society responds to his calling. In fact, a warrior's place in life compels him to go to war and it is morally wrong for him to refuse. "Indian history has not been lacking in wars, and there has been little in Hindu religion to inhibit this."<sup>19</sup>

Hindus and Muslims have fought one another intermittently for hundreds of years and the current tension between India and Pakistan is only the latest manifestation of that age-old cross-cultural conflict.

Finally Judaism, the wellspring of both Christianity and Islam, is the focus of the cross-cultural and religious conflict surrounding the Israeli state. The Jewish experience with warfare stretches from Biblical times through Roman conquest, the Crusades, two world wars and the Arab-Israeli wars and shapes the Hebrew outlook on warfare. The emphasis of Judaism is peace, but war is an accepted political instrument of national power, especially for self-defense. Modern Hebrew scholars contend that there are three types of war - optional war, obligatory war and prohibited war. Optional or permissive war, e.g. for expansion, do not obligate the Hebrew to fight. Obligatory or mandatory war, e.g. for survival, obligate all to participate. Prohibited war includes wars of religious conversion or wars for civilization or against barbarism.<sup>20</sup> In Judaism the moral application of war protects civilian non-combatants, prohibits excessive damage and protects the environment. "In general . . . war [is] justified only if directed to constructive ends . . . and there is a

general obligation for the individual to be actively involved on the side of good against evil.”<sup>21</sup> Given the current political situation in the Middle East and the juxtaposition of Judaism, Islam and Christianity in that part of the world, cross-cultural conflict will continue and religion will play a significant role.

Religion is inextricably linked to and shapes culture, providing the moral basis for civilized society and influencing attitudes toward entry into and the conduct of war. For the operational commander, a fuller understanding of cultural and religious attitudes toward war beyond western just war theory promotes understanding of why an adversary or a coalition partner fights. Proper application of this knowledge during operational planning allows for better use of allies and for developing courses of action that more readily attack an adversary's center of gravity while helping to protect one's own. History is replete with examples of operational commanders and political leaders ignoring cultural and religious differences to their great peril and ultimate operational failure. The twentieth century alone provides numerous cases demonstrating the importance of cultural and religious operational considerations.

Japan emerged from the nineteenth century as a growing regional power with expansionist aims in Asia that inevitably clashed with those of Russia. A simmering political dispute between Russia and Japan over interests in Manchuria and Korea lasted for several years and led ultimately to the outbreak of hostilities in 1904. Russia, one of the great powers of Europe and a giant economically and militarily compared to Japan, appeared to have all the necessary advantages to win a limited war quickly and decisively. Unfortunately Russian political and military leaders understood very little about Japanese culture. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities "there is plenty of evidence of popular Russian contempt for the impudent little Japanese."<sup>22</sup> As a result Russian operational commanders were surprised and soundly defeated at Port Arthur and in Manchuria while the Russian fleet was destroyed at the Battle of Tsushima. Racial bigotry and cultural ignorance played a significant role in the defeat of a great power by a much weaker one.

During World War II Germany initiated Operation Barbarossa without a full appreciation of the cultural subtleties of conducting a "colonial war of exploitation, and a racist war of annihilation."<sup>23</sup> German operational

commanders, disdaining the martial ability of the Slavic people while considering them subhuman as a race, failed completely to consider cultural realities during operational planning. Disregarding accepted laws of war, German soldiers were instructed to immediately kill commissars of the Red Army and to brutally eliminate partisans while German "soldiers committing crimes against the civilian population [were not to] be prosecuted."<sup>24</sup> The attempted brutal pacification of conquered areas in this manner did not garner the results expected. Rather, this ideological and racial warfare, absent moral constraints, failed to resolve the partisan problem, led to loss of proportionality on both sides, and contributed greatly to Germany's ultimate defeat on the eastern front.

There are many reasons for American failure in Vietnam and cultural ignorance is but one of them. American involvement in the war increased incrementally until such time that the United States found itself fixed in a quagmire from which honorable exit was not possible.

Early on the U. S. military provided only material assistance and advice on the ground. Political leaders did not consider Vietnamese culture as it pertained to



actions necessary to defeat the insurgency. Borrowing from the British example of successful counter-guerilla warfare in Malaya the U. S., in order to deny the guerilla his local support, decided to move farmers into secure enclaves called strategic hamlets.<sup>25</sup> Those who supported the plan did not appreciate the negative religious and cultural impact of this strategy on the Vietnamese. In a society where ancestor worship and gravesite veneration is practiced, the forceful removal of a family from its ancient village is a blasphemous, and anti-religious act; it is also resented for economic and cultural reasons.<sup>26</sup>

Later in the war the impact of cultural ignorance became even more pronounced and operationally debilitating. General Westmoreland, the operational commander, viewed the war as "a protracted war of attrition . . . [which required] unrestricted use of American troops within South Vietnam."<sup>27</sup> Using World War II proven tactics, he embraced a search and destroy strategy designed for conventional warfare against an enemy that would not follow the script. The American military, populated by personnel suffering from culture shock and ignorance, replaced the French as colonial masters in the eyes of many Vietnamese. The cultural gap

between the Vietnamese and their American ally became a destructive operational factor unmitigated by the vehement application of superior firepower. The operational commander did not understand the significance of Vietnamese culture and religion and therefore did not correctly identify the enemy's center of gravity nor properly protect his own. Operational and tactical battlefield victories were irrelevant, the outcome of the war determined at the strategic level, as the military tool was misapplied in a war never fully understood by its military or political leadership.

The U. S. involvement in Somalia during 1992-1994 is also instructive regarding cultural impacts on operational success. Somalia was a three-phased operation of first, airlifting food relief and medical supplies, second, continued humanitarian assistance coupled with security for relief efforts, and third, a peace enforcement operation.<sup>28</sup> Initial success in averting humanitarian disaster did not translate into final achievement of operational and strategic objectives as the realities of cultural differences negatively impacted the operation and led to U. S. failure to bring peace to Somalia. U. S. forces entered Somalia with little understanding of the homogeneous nomadic clan

based Muslim society void of a central government. Similar to Vietnam, American soldiers entered Somalia with little understanding of the culture. The inevitable result was misunderstanding, alienation, and resentment by the intended beneficiary of American intervention.

"The American command believed the Somalis to be intellectually primitive, culturally shallow, and militarily craven."<sup>29</sup> Commanders sought to limit interaction between Somalis and the personnel there to assist them in order to avoid cultural missteps. Viewing Somalis as potentially disease infested khat-chewing thugs, the gulf between the military and Somali citizens grew over time as operational commanders, overly reliant on tactical commanders to avoid cultural blunders, failed to provide the cultural instruction and leadership necessary to bridge cultural gaps.<sup>30</sup> Once the operation evolved into peace enforcement the inevitable decisive military clash transpired. Underestimating Somalis led to the disaster of Task Force Ranger and ultimate failure in Somalia. Somalis studied and learned American military tactics and were able to "exploit the soft spots of Task Force Ranger's standard tactics."<sup>31</sup> The Somalis, sacrificing over 300 of their own personnel, inflicted an operational defeat on American forces that destroyed the

political resolve to continue toward achievement of the political objective and the U. S. withdrew.

The U.S. military has deployed and participated around the world intervening in conflicts that have a significant cultural and religious dimension. In Beirut, Marines found themselves involved in a situation in which different Muslim sects disputed among themselves and with the Christian sector of society in a confusing and costly failed intervention. As Yugoslavia devolved along ethnic, cultural and religious fault lines, the U. S. found itself militarily engaged in Bosnia and Kosovo in which "all sides [relied] mostly on military means to obtain their political and ethno-religious goals."<sup>32</sup> The American military will assuredly be involved in future cross-cultural conflicts.

"Countries, clans, military services, and individual soldiers are products of their respective cultures, and they are either empowered or imprisoned."<sup>33</sup> The growth of nationalism and fundamentalism in an ever more globalized world economy ensures that cross-cultural interaction and conflict will continue. "It appears likely that our military will find itself drawn into intercultural struggles . . . if only because it will be impossible to appease challengers bent on supplanting us, punishing us,

or destroying us.”<sup>34</sup> Following the political decision to intervene somewhere in the future, the imperative for operational commanders to consider culture and religion while planning is obvious. Doctrine must guide the operational commander’s cultural mission analysis in order to avoid the mistakes of the past. Unfortunately, current doctrine does not provide a comprehensive and structured approach to cultural and religious considerations in the operational planning process.

There exists no joint doctrinal publication specifically devoted to the religious and cultural dimension of operational planning and execution.<sup>35</sup> The discussion of and guidance for these critical factors is spread throughout several doctrinal publications. A planner, interested in and understanding the importance of these factors, must actively research information found in several seemingly unrelated volumes. The logical first step is to look at joint doctrine for peace operations.

Joint peace operations doctrine addresses civil-military relations, negotiation and mediation, public affairs and media, legal responsibilities and refugee considerations.<sup>36</sup> There is no doctrinal guidance devoted exclusively to culture and religion. References are made

to culture within the responsibilities of the chaplain that emphasize "it is important for the joint force commander (JFC) to have an understanding of the religious groups and movements within the operational area and the potential impact that they may have on the accomplishment of the mission."<sup>37</sup> Additionally, within the discussion of negotiation and mediation the doctrine refers to the organizational cultures that may impact negotiations.<sup>38</sup> Doctrine also suggests "cultural awareness provides a framework for rendering assistance to . . . refugees, displaced persons, or migrants."<sup>39</sup> No useful planning guidance is offered beyond the superficial advice reviewed above.

The next logical location to seek guidance for the cultural and religious dimension of operational planning is within joint intelligence doctrine as it applies to the intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Within an appendix to basic joint intelligence support to military operations doctrine there are several references to culture and religion. In Representative Intelligence Requirements the planner can find general guidance with regard to languages, ethnic composition, religion, customs, foreign influences and host nation popular attitudes and reactions to US forces.<sup>40</sup> Additionally,

joint intelligence tactics, techniques and procedures, reviews the human dimension of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) process without elaboration of its effects.<sup>41</sup> The joint doctrine for JIPB is comprehensive and complete for most functions but does not provide comprehensive guidance for the planner regarding either the religious or cultural dimension of operational planning.

Within Joint Task Force planning guidance the responsibilities delineated for the chaplain include liaison with international forces and appropriate host nation chaplains and "assessing cultural and religious influences on mission accomplishment."<sup>42</sup> Guidance concerning intelligence sharing and operational planning speaks to the importance of exchanging liaison personnel to eliminate possible cultural problems when conducting multinational operations.<sup>43</sup> And, although it provides multiple checklists for various staff members to consider while planning and contains a thorough discussion of mission analysis and the commander's estimate process, it contains no definitive guidance on the cultural and religious dimension of operational planning.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) joint doctrine also only provides the briefest of discussions concerning culture and religion. When conducting MOOTW planners are advised that "intelligence collection . . . might require a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation."<sup>44</sup> It also briefly addresses the capabilities that Special Operations Forces and Civil Affairs units possess regarding language and cultural understanding. But the doctrine offers no definitive guidance for the consideration or integration of that information in the operational planning process.

Joint Doctrine for multinational operations is similar in that culture and religion are briefly touched upon in non-specific terms that do not provide the operational planner with concrete tools to use during development of courses of action. Doctrine indicates that, as it is important that we know our enemy, it is equally important to understand allies. Culture is addressed as a planning consideration for accommodation of religious holidays, prayer calls and other unique cultural traditions. Additionally, commanders are



cautioned that religion will have a serious impact on multinational operations and religious differences must be identified and addressed during the planning process.<sup>45</sup>

Doctrinal review reveals no comprehensive or single authoritative volume to guide the operational planner when considering culture and religion during course of action development. Although culture and religion are briefly addressed superficially in various doctrinal volumes, the planner, if conscious of the necessity to consider them at all, is required to seek information and guidance that is not readily evident or especially useful. To remedy the lack of focus on the operational impact of culture and religion several mutually supporting options are available. First, add a Cultural Advisor to the Combatant Commander's personal staff. Second, develop Rules of Cultural Interaction for use at the tactical and individual level for a given operation. Third, and most significantly, develop and codify in joint doctrine a framework for considering religion and culture during the Commander's Estimate of the Situation process.

The Combatant Commander's personal staff currently includes "a staff judge advocate, [political advisor], public affairs officer, inspector general, provost

marshal, chaplain, surgeon, historian, and others as directed.”<sup>46</sup> This staff does not possess the expertise necessary to ensure that cultural or religious blunders do not affect operational success. The addition of a cultural advisor, given the likelihood that future conflicts will be cross-cultural and flavored by religious differences, is imperative. The cultural advisor, schooled in the distinctive attributes of the region, will be the primary source of cultural and religious counsel during operational planning. The advisor, to ensure currency and accuracy, will also scrutinize cultural and religious training programs for use by the force prior to deployment. Finally, the advisor will supervise development of proposed Rules of Cultural Interaction issued to members of the Joint Task Force prior to plan execution.

Similar to Rules of Engagement (ROE), cultural interaction rules will guide individual service personnel in the proper culture-neutral execution of their duties, especially during operations other than war. Given the historical evidence of the significant impact of cultural missteps on mission accomplishment, operational commanders cannot rely on tactical commanders to properly control inevitable interactions with the populace in a

given operational area. Pre-deployment cultural/religious training is accomplished, but retention of lessons is problematic given the multiple distractions and requirements levied on individuals as they ready the organization for mission execution. Guidance must be developed and disseminated in a top-down manner fully utilizing the cultural and religious expertise resident at the operational commander's level in the person of the cultural advisor. As ROE are simplified and concisely written at the operational level for ease of use at the tactical level, so to will cultural rules be abridged and made useful for each member of the force. The rules of cultural interaction must be distilled to the simplest of guidelines published on a card for distribution to each individual (similar to ROE Card distribution). The card must address significant cultural and religious matters and guide individual action. The card, together with pre-deployment cultural and religious training, will guide service members as they inevitably interact with persons that are dissimilar to those with which they normally interrelate. An example of a proposed cultural interaction card (Figure 1) follows:



## Rules of Cultural Interaction for Operation Restore

### Hope

1. Somalis are Muslim. Respect their desire for frequent prayer.
2. Practice courtesy and modesty.
3. Treat all with dignity and respect.
4. Somali consumption of khat is socially normal - do not intervene.
5. Do not offer gifts to females - your intention may be misunderstood.
6. Expect most Somali males to be armed - employ proper ROE.
7. All members of society identify with a certain clan - remain neutral.

Figure 1. Proposed Rules of Cultural Interaction Card

This example is intentionally simple. The commander's cultural advisor, more fully aware of cultural and religious tripwires, will certainly develop a more comprehensive and complete cultural interaction card for use in a given situation.

Finally, a framework for considering culture and religion within a modified CES process is offered at Appendix A. The framework integrates culture and religion into the process to force the Joint Planning Group (JPG), during mission analysis and course of action development, to properly ascertain their impact on

mission execution and operational success. As mentioned, joint doctrine provides snippets of guidance in widely dispersed locations within several publications that do not emphasize cultural and religious significance. The proposed framework for planning compresses that guidance into the CES process so that staff officers regard culture and religion in a routine manner as they would other critical factors of operational art.

The J2 determines enemy capabilities, limitations, intentions and potential courses of action. During the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) the J2, assisted by the cultural advisor, must also gather cultural and religious information describing the society, its customs, religious practices, external cultural and religious influences, cultural and religious attitudes toward warfare, level of religious tolerance, and significant historical cultural and religious tensions and international interactions. Once collected, that data must be available and displayed prominently during mission analysis and course of action development for consideration of its impact on plan execution. During mission analysis cultural/religious information from the JIPB are likely to impact assumptions, constraints, restraints, implied tasks and initial risk

assessment. Cultural/religious factors contemplated during course of action development will influence actions considered to achieve mission success. Identified negative impact on feasibility, suitability, or acceptability leads to course of action rejection or modification to mitigate the potential damaging effects.

The framework offered at Appendix A is designed to ensure the JPG is aware of and considers culture and religion throughout the CES process. This framework, if added to joint doctrine in the discussion of the CES in Joint Pub 5-00.2, provides a comprehensive single source compilation of existing cultural and religious aspects of planning found widely dispersed in joint doctrine. The JPG currently employs the CES process for course of action selection by the operational commander. The modified CES framework (Appendix A) encourages the JPG to consider the important cultural and religious factors listed there in a more structured manner. Visibility of these important considerations during the CES process precludes omission or only perfunctory consideration.

The addition of a cultural advisor to the combatant commander's staff, the routine issue of Rules of Cultural Interaction, and the modified CES framework are mutually supporting recommendations ensuring culture and religion

the serious consideration necessary for proper mission planning and execution. Cultural rules of interaction, similar to ROE, must be developed during the CES process and support the course of action selected. The commander, after consultation with the cultural advisor, approves those rules prior to dissemination to the force.

Concurrent rules vetting ensures that culture and religion are considered during and support the planning process. These mutually supporting changes raise the visibility of culture and religion during the joint operational planning process and support mitigation of their potential negative effects.

Cross-cultural conflict, ethno-religious terrorism, religious and ethnic wars, and MOOTW in culturally oriented disputes are the most likely operational challenges facing U. S. forces in the future. The current lack of emphasis and structure within joint doctrine regarding culture and religion renders proper mission analysis and course of action development problematic. The changes proposed are the first step in placing cultural and religious considerations in the proper perspective during the CES process. The changes will make routine the proper consideration of these particularly important operational factors during mission

planning and execution and eliminate the errors that historically have led to unforeseen consequences and mission failure.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

<sup>2</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997) 21.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 125-126. \_

<sup>4</sup> Robert G. Clouse, War: Four Christian Views, (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1991), 118.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 119-120.

<sup>6</sup> John Ferguson, War and Peace in the World's Religions, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 111.

<sup>7</sup> Navy Department, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M (Norfolk, VA: October 1995), 5-1/5.3.

<sup>8</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, CJCSI 3121.01A (Washington, DC: 15 January 2000), A-6.

<sup>9</sup> Terry Nardin, The Ethics of War and Peace, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 131.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 130.

<sup>11</sup> Ferguson, 130.



<sup>12</sup> Nardin, 165.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 141.

<sup>14</sup> Ferguson, 47.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>18</sup> William B. Eerdman's, Eerdman's Handbook to the World's Religions, (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 175-179.

<sup>19</sup> Ferguson, 34.

<sup>20</sup> Nardin, 97-98.

<sup>21</sup> Ferguson, 95.

<sup>22</sup> Richard Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia 1894-1943, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 60

<sup>23</sup> John Gooch, Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, (Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1990), 108.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>25</sup> A. J. Langguth, Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 167-168.

<sup>26</sup> Paul R. Wrigley, "The Impact of Religious Belief in the Theater of Operations," Naval War College Review, (Spring 1996 Vol. XLIX, No. 2), 96.

<sup>27</sup> W. Scott Thompson & Donaldson D. Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977), 60-61.

<sup>28</sup> Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), xvii.

- <sup>29</sup> Jonathan Stevenson, Losing Mogadishu: Testing U. S. Policy in Somalia, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 115.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 62.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., 115
- <sup>32</sup> Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1994), 229.
- <sup>33</sup> Ralph Peters, Fighting for the Futures: Will America Triumph?, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 148.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid., 13.
- <sup>35</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electronic Library CD-ROM, Washington, DC: September 2001
- <sup>36</sup> Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, (Fort Monroe, VA: 16 June 1997), vii-ix.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., III-13.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid., IV-18.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., XII-2.
- <sup>40</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint Pub 2-01 (Washington, DC: 20 November 1996), B-2/4.
- <sup>41</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Joint Pub 2-01.3 (Washington, DC: 24 May 2000), II-37.
- <sup>42</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-00.2 (Washington, DC: 13 January 1999), II-17.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid., VI-8, VII-14.
- <sup>44</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995), IV-2.

<sup>45</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Pub 3-16 (Washington, DC: 5 April 2000), I-10, III-14, and III-21.

<sup>46</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Pub 0-2 (Washington, DC: 10 July 2001), V-14.

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
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
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# APPENDIX A: MODIFIED COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION



## APPENDIX A: MODIFIED COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

### Analysis of COAs





## APPENDIX A: MODIFIED COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION